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Note, e.g., Tillich’s observation that “Spinoza’s
influence [on his work] is prophetic and mystical as well
as sapiential,” ST, 3, 3.
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See ST, 1: Part 2 (‘Being and God’) and Biblical
Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1955).
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See ST, 1: Part 2 (“Being and God”) and The Courage to Be.
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Note that these three forms of anxiety correlate
with the three moments in Tillich’s dialectical concept of
life—the moments of self-creation (mortality), selfintegration (morality), and self-transcendence (meaninglessness or tragedy)—and the three moments in his understanding of sin (discussed below)—concupiscence, unbelief, and tragic hubris.
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__________________________________________
Confronting the Powers: Tillich,
Stout, and West on Democratic
Principles and Procedures
Jonathan Rothchild
Recent debates regarding the formal characteristics of democracy have been widespread and polemical. Whether construed in terms of imperialistic
concerns (e.g., the imposition of American political
values on non-democratic and non-Western countries), constitutional questions (e.g., the blurring of
church and state through administered services of
faith-based organizations or religiously affiliated
hospitals), or identity politics (e.g., the question of
whether democracy protects and cultivates pluralism
or homogenizes and reduces otherness to sameness),
these debates compel interrogation of the basic presuppositions underlying democratic principles and
procedures and the extent to which theological reflections inform these presuppositions. Paul Tillich
experienced the horrors of non-democratic seizures
of power in his German homeland, and his emigration to America deepened his resistance to the demonic powers that dehumanize, destroy, and dominate social and political life. This essay argues that
Tillich’s writings on political life, particularly his
1933 The Socialist Decision, challenge democratic
theorists and current public policy makers to rethink
their assumptions about the form, function, and
meanings of democracy.
My purpose is to engage Tillich and present interlocutors on democracy. Such a conversation re-

quires a multi-layered analysis: (1) An excursus into
the historical trajectories in American politics vis-àvis the relationship between church and state that
problematizes strict separation and strict union; (2)
An engagement between Tillich and Jeffrey Stout
and Cornel West on the anthropological, experiential, and religious dimensions of democracy; and (3)
An analysis of the present policies of President Bush
and the “elite” democracy of Richard Posner with
respect to the perspectives of Tillich, Stout, and
West. My thesis holds that separation, whether construed in terms of the strict separation between
church and state, between individual and community, or between power and justice, has overdetermined contemporary visions of democracy at
substantial moral costs. Though they differ in significant ways, the models of democracy envisaged
by Tillich, Stout, and West more comprehensively
address the necessarily dialectical interplay between
separation and union within a democracy than the
policies implemented by the Bush administration.
I. A Brief History of Church-State Relations:
Separation and Democracy
Discussion of the church-state relations can be
traced back to the Gospels, when Jesus’ dictum to
render unto Caesar (Mark 12:17; cf. Matthew 22:21)
exposed the co-existence of two spheres, religious
and political. Models of the interaction of these two
spheres range from Augustine’s two cities, Aquinas’s eternal, natural, and human laws, and Martin
Luther’s two kingdoms. To contextualize our analysis of democracy and its modern theological and phi-
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losophical discontents, we must limit our scope to a
brief examination the trajectory of the church versus
state debate in the United States. Such an examination reveals the ambiguities embedded in notions of
strict separation. Philip Hamburger begins his 2002
Separation of Church and State by citing the “strict
wall of separation between Church and State”1 in
Thomas Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists. Hamburger works meticulously to disabuse the
assumption that such a wall of separation was
unanimously embraced or even actively tolerated by
American religious and political actors. Examining
the writings of seventeenth and eighteenth century
Protestants such as Richard Hooker and Roger Williams, Hamburger clarifies that their misgivings
about union between church and state “was not a
demand for separation.”2 Hamburger argues that
practices such as the exclusion of clergy from civil
office stemmed from a variety of factors,3 but these
factors did not include the grounds of separation. In
the early nineteenth century, motivated by political
exigencies, Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans
opposed the Federalists and began to promote a
separation between church and state that persuaded
later presidents such as James Madison and Andrew
Jackson. Yet, in what Stout and West would praise
as thick description, Hamburger explains that these
appeals to separation were largely politically motivated rhetorical devices until they confronted the
practical religious conflicts in the mid-nineteenth
century, notably the rise of anti-Catholicism.
Spurred by violent clashes and quarrels over public
school funds between Protestants and Catholics and
exacerbated by Catholic resistance to separation,
many Protestants “used the principle of separation to
argue against Catholic participation in politics.”4
These conflicts increasingly helped instill separation
among the Protestant majority as cultural assumptions that contributed to the evolving democratic
traditions.
An insightful component of Hamburger’s analysis (and one that has relevance for our discussion of
democratic principles) is his recognition of the moral
costs of a purely procedural separation. Hamburger
notes that separation, in some contexts, enabled
“Americans to fend off moral demands with which
they did not wish to comply”5 and thereby raised the
democratic stakes of the distinction between church
and state. These moral costs reflected the reticence
of political minorities and the church to offer critical
voices that, as we will observe with respect to West,
Stout, and Tillich, constitute sine qua non for de-
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mocracy. Despite these costs, separation continued
to gain favor after the Civil War, when President
Ulysses Grant championed separation as the best
way to preserve individual freedom. This call for
freedom was embraced in the early twentieth century
by nativist Protestant groups, including the decisively undemocratic Ku Klux Klan, whom Hamburger holds, “probably more than any other national
group in the first half of the [twentieth] century,
drew Americans to the principle of separation.”6
Driven by the “culture of Americanism and its conception of separation as an American liberty”7 and
continuously funded by anti-Catholicism (exemplified by the reaction to Catholic Al Smith’s presidential bid) but also emergent secularism, separation as
a fundamental aspect of American democracy continued to marshal support.
Nonetheless, Hamburger notes, it was not until
1947 in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing (330 U.S. 1) that the Supreme Court
finally interpreted the First Amendment as requiring
separation of church and state.8 In writing the decision for the court, Justice Black cited Jefferson’s
1802 letter advocating for the wall of separation,
thus suggesting circularity to the historical phenomenon of separation. But this circularity, as will
be noted in the next section with respect to the myth
of origin, cannot address the in-breaking of the new.
Hamburger describes the paradoxical reception of
the Everson decision in decades that followed:
“Even as Americans wondered about separation’s
meaning, they treated its constitutional legitimacy as
sacrosanct. Having enshrined the doctrine of separation in their Constitution, they deferred to it with
reverence and viewed any dissent from it as profoundly anti-American.”9 This failure to examine
self-reflexively the principles and procedures of
one’s own democratic traditions accounts for the
present polemical debates and the potentially unresolvable democratic disagreements regarding separation.
Hamburger’s work thus reveals the ways in
which the roots and formation of separation lie less
in purely constitutional foundations but rather in a
conflicted history that occasionally restricted freedom when “American majorities used the separation
of church and state to impose their vision of their
religion and their Americanism upon religious minorities.”10 Such a history serves as a useful point of
departure for our study because it invites critical reflection on mediating grounds between union and
separation within a democracy.
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The remainder of the essay will expand the
question of union and separation of church and state
to encompass the questions of union and separation
within the democratic process as a whole.
II. Stout, West, and Tillich: Confronting the
Challenge of Separation
A. Stout’s Pragmatic Mediation of Rawls/Rorty and
Hauerwas/Milbank
The basic thesis of Jeffrey Stout’s 2004 Democracy and Tradition is that democracy is a tradition,
that is, it “inculcates certain habits of reasoning, certain attitudes toward deference and authority in political discussion, and love for certain good and virtues.”11 As we will note below with respect to West
and Tillich, Stout foregrounds his discussion of political structures and procedures with an analysis of
its humanly experienced motivations and effects.
Stout’s pragmatism, which he designates as “democratic traditionalism,”12 therefore locates the significance of democratic tradition not within procedures
but rather within the formation of “enduring attitudes, concerns, dispositions and patterns of conduct” wherein “normative commitments are embedded as well as discussed.”13 These normative commitments signify the products of deliberative debates, always subject to the “critical scrutiny”14 advocated by Tillich and West, and necessarily involve
appeals to religion. These appeals vitiate the assumptions of strict separation within democracy.
The questions regarding the role of religion within
democratic tradition, Stout believes, have been complicated by two approaches, one the secular liberal
approach of thinkers such as Rawls and Rorty, and
the other the new traditionalism of Hauerwas and
Milbank, which, for radically distinct reasons, separate religion and democracy. Stout depicts the
prominence of these two approaches as interrelated:
“The more thoroughly Rawlsian our law schools and
ethics centers become, the more radically Hauerwasian the theologically schools become.”15 Thus,
Stout’s book seeks to mediate between the separation of religion and democracy, that is, between the
Rawlsian/ Rortian view of religion as a conversation-stopper for democratic consensus and the Hauerwasian/ Milbankian view of religion that neglects
the importance of democracy for religious structures
and beliefs.
Stout’s brand of pragmatism appropriates various strategies to carry out this mediation. Stout
combines the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, criticisms of
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Kantian pure practical reason (also noted by Tillich),16 and dialectical normative expressivism with
an Emersonian celebration of historical consciousness and “a form of social life that celebrates democratic individuality as a positive good.”17 Democracy
must therefore accommodate individual, community,
and society in ways that do not reduce their interactions to purely abstract formalism or procedures.
Stout posits that religious voices must contribute to
the ongoing conversation of what undergirds democracy. Whereas Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory “leaves democracy almost entirely out of the
picture,”18 Stout lauds Barth’s Barmen Declaration
that opposed the Nazis as “a theologically rich account of what it means for Christians to be involved
in modern, secularized political communities.”19
Though Stout seemingly oversimplifies the radicality of Barth’s theology20 that some interpreters, including Tillich, have critiqued, Stout concludes that
Barth’s assertion of truth claims is vital to democracy because “[w]ithout truth-claims, there would be
no communication, no exchange of reasons.”21
Stout castigates Stanley Hauerwas for conceptualizing democratic citizens as “essentially rootless
individuals”22 or, as I have identified it, as essentially separated individuals. Hauerwas’s own vision,
informed by Yoder and MacIntyre, does not endorse
democracy in the decisive means for cultivating virtue; rather, his view insists that the Christian life is
revealed in faith narratives, which Stout argues are
located within a “premodern authoritarian tradition.”23 Stout’s criticisms are trenchant, but he does
not fully appreciate the extent to which Hauerwas
does affirm Christian participation in democratic
structures. As Hauerwas has written: “[Christians]
have a stake in fostering those forms of human association that ensure that the virtues can be sustained.”24 Stout’s critique, however, does correctly
point to the limits of Hauerwas’s perspectives, vis-àvis democracy as a tradition. Hauerwas’s view cannot appreciate that our situatedness in a democracy
necessitates the formation of broader communal
frameworks and participation in discursive practices
of normative expressivism that shape character and
identity without eviscerating individual uniqueness
or truth claims.
Stout affirms that these discursive practices can
and should make claims to truth instantiated, for example, in Christian claims. How then can Stout
bring together the Rawlsian call for consensus and
the Hauerwasian demand for distinctiveness? Does
Stout’s mediated solution exact any moral costs of
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its own? Stout’s rejoinder minimizes these moral
costs by coalescing objective and subjective moral
dimensions, where “[p]ragmatism offers a social
theory of moral objectivity—according to which
both objective ethical norms and the subjectivity of
those who apply them are made possible in part by
social interactions among individuals.”25 In terms of
the moral objectivity, Stout argues that the expressive function of democracy can entail claims to unconditional obligations without violating the democracy as a discursive and social practice. In terms of
moral subjectivity, even as he repudiates the correspondence theory of truth because “it has no explanatory values,”26 Stout insists that moral diversity
neither reduces democratic conversation to a relativist conception of truth nor results in an “antitheological” stance.27 Stout determines that “[t]he concept of truth is normative,” but his pragmatist remedy demands that we “drop the identification of truth
with power.”28 Thus, in Stout’s judgment, religious
claims or other truth claims shorn of their metaphysical presuppositions can fund critical democratic reflection on the normative rules and substantive meanings of political discourse. In ways similar
to the establishment of soccer rules as an “objective
affair,”29 Stout envisions that religious claims contribute to the rational revision of democratic principles and procedures. These revisions reflect careful,
but contentious dialogue within thick cultural contexts, though Stout’s model admits latitude and even
reversals “when we undergo social and spiritual crises”30 and thereby must transcend our own tradition.
This dialectic of tradition and crisis affords necessary correctives to the strict separation between the
theoretical and practical dimensions of democratic
reflection.
B. West’s Pragmatic Mediation of Imperialism and
Nihilism
Cornel West is a synthetic intellectual who,
similar to Stout and Tillich, diagnoses the current
situation and correlates it with answers by meditating different traditions. Indebted to the “unashamedly moral emphasis and its unequivocally ameliorative impulse”31 of American pragmatism, Marxism,32
and critical poststructuralist theory, West employs a
structural and prophetic critique of democracy. In his
2004 book, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight
Against Imperialism, West juxtaposes the three most
pernicious threats to democracy—free-market fundamentalism, aggressive militarism, and escalating
authoritarianism—with the traditions that sustain
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democracy—Socratic questioning, prophetic critique, and tragicomic hope.33 The threats to democracy derive from two principal sources, an imperialistic and corporate-driven base of power, and the
general apathy of a society reluctant to challenge this
power that separates individuals, communities, and
society. The vibrancy of a democracy, cautions
West, depends crucially on democratic vigilance, a
core characteristic of the democratic traditions in
America.
One of West’s insights, as we observed with
Stout and will with Tillich, is that theorizing about
democracy requires inquiry into human anthropology and the humanly experienced beliefs (particularly despair, cynicism, and hope) vis-à-vis the prospects for democratic procedures. West steadfastly
asserts with John Dewey and Ralph Waldo Emerson
that “[d]emocracy is not just a system of governance, as we tend to think of it, but a cultural way of
being.”34 West and Stout both understand democracy
as principally a way of life and not a configuration
of procedures, but Stout suggests that their anthropological perspectives regarding democracy signal a
key distinction between his pragmatism and West’s:
“But we differ over the grounds of democratic hope
in a way that leaves me closer to Ellison and him
closer to an Augustinian like Reinhold Niebuhr.”35
Disturbed that “Socrates never cries”36 and therefore
misunderstands democracy’s tragic character, West
holds with Niebuhr (and Tillich) that one must take
seriously the flaws, faults, and moral blindness of
individual and systems. These faults and blindness—
encapsulated in Augustine’s notion of the self curvatus in se—problematize democratic assumptions and
exacerbate separation. I therefore argue that West’s
anthropological model more effectively captures the
current discontent for democratic practices than
Stout’s.37 West explains that Dewey’s pragmatism—
a pragmatism to which both Stout and West are indebted—fails to “meet the challenge posed by Lincoln, namely, defining the relation of democratic
ways of thought and life to a profound sense of
evil.”38 Identifying Josiah Royce but also Chekhov,
Coltrane, and Niebuhr as those who confronted this
challenge, West affirms that “a deep sense of evil
and the tragic must infuse any meaning and value of
democracy.”39 Recognizing the inexorable tensions
between evil and good, tragic and hope, or, as Tillich
puts it, the inner contradiction of human life, West
affirms that pragmatism renders these tensions productive by promoting individual volition and com-
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munal justice in the face of historical limits, human
evil, and fateful circumstances.
In addressing this evil, tragic, but ineluctably
hopeful current context, West builds on his earlier
book Race Matters and characterizes the current
situation as one of crisis or consciousness of meaninglessness and nihilism among minority and marginalized communities. Using language that resembles Stout’s idea of crisis and Tillich’s ontological
concepts of non-being and estrangement, West describes the youth of America: “[M]any lack the necessary navigational skills to cope with the challenges
and crises in life—disappointment, disease, death.
This is why so many are enacting the nihilism of
meaninglessness and hopelessness in their lives that
mirrors the nihilism of the adult world.”40 This nihilism has a perniciously self-destructive character that
West identifies as “walking nihilism,” or “the imposing of closure on the human organism, intentionally,
by that organism itself.”41 The resonance between
West’s walking nihilism and Tillich’s demonic will
be noted below, but, here it is imperative to note that
what is equally troubling for West is the moral
blindness to this destruction and self-destruction that
lies at the roots of the American democratic tradition. West argues that the practice of slavery and
imperialist exploitation “were undeniable preconditions for the possibility of American democracy.”42
These racist and imperial preconditions impose a
hypocritical separation of individuals onto the
American democratic foundations; they press Tillich’s system, though it refutes dehumanization, to
rethink its drive toward self-centeredness, and they
censure Stout’s attempt, though it acknowledges the
pernicious effects of racism, to unify the objective
and subjective dimensions of democratic life. In
fleshing out the moral costs of this exploitative basis
for democracy, West would additionally criticize
Tillich’s appeal to elite forms of art as only partially
disclosive of form and meaning that must also include forms of popular culture (e.g., hip-hop) and
power struggles in the streets.43
Given West’s concerns for the racist and imperialistic dimensions of democracy, he turns, as does
Stout, to resources within democracy’s traditions to
retrieve and self-reflexively to critique these foundations. West appeals to two strands, an Emersonian
and a Melvillean strand. The former, represented by
thinkers such as James Baldwin, focuses on the individual commitment to democracy and democracy’s
potential, but it also seeks to “inspire an America
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caught in a web of self-deception and selfcelebration.”44 The latter, represented by thinkers
such as Toni Morrison, unmasks the procedures and
prejudices that threaten individuality and intends to
“shatter moral numbness and awaken sleepwalking.”45 Both hermeneutical strands resonate with Tillich’s religious socialism and cultivate resistance by
critically correlating democratic practices, beliefs,
and procedures in a way that restores relationships
between individuals, communities, and society.
Christianity, in West’s judgment, provides a vital
role in this resistance, for “[t]he most influential social movements for justice in America have been led
by prophetic Christians.”46 West adamantly denounces a Christian co-opting of power, tantamount
to a Constantinian Christianity, that threatens tolerance and open dialogue, and therefore he censures
the “terrible merger of church and state [that] has
been behind so many of the church’s worst violations of Christian love and justice.”47 In light of
Hamburger’s history of the complex variables that
impact relations between church and state, West’s
point is well-taken, but it would need to be reconceived more carefully to address better the underlying issues.
However, similar to Hamburger’s problematizing of strict separation discussed above, West also
resists the temptation to compartmentalize and
thereby separate religion and democracy. In explicitly endorsing the attractiveness of Stout’s mediating
between secular liberals and religious traditionalism,48 West, on the one hand, gainsays Rawls’s proceduralism (“it fails to acknowledge how our loyalty
to constitutional and civic ideals may have religious
motivations”49) and Rorty’s pragmatism (“his secular policing of public life is too rigid and his secular
faith is too pure”50). On the other hand, West cannot
concur with Hauerwas’s vision (“he unduly downplays the prophetic Christian commitment to justice
and our role as citizens to make America more free
and democratic”51) and Milbank’s model (“he fails
to appreciate the moral progress, political breakthroughs, and spiritual freedoms forged by the heroic efforts of modern citizens of religious and secular traditions.”52) In his own forging of a prophetic
pragmatism as an intermediary between these perspectives, West insists that Christianity must play an
important role without usurping or co-opting secular
power, lapsing into utopia or radical pessimism, or
eliminating the problem of fatedness; rather, Christianity and prophetic pragmatism strengthen democracy by interrelating the potency of human creativity
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for good and evil with the absolute demands of justice within the postmodern context marked by “degraded otherness, subjected alienness, and subaltern
marginality.”53 In this way, Christianity and democracy are neither completely separate nor completely
unified, and West affirms the formula articulated by
the “prophetic pragmatist” theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy
possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes
democracy necessary.”54
C. Tillich’s Prophetic Critique of Power
In the Foreword to his 1933 The Socialist Decision, Paul Tillich reflects on the crisis of the situation, where the enemies of socialism “threaten the
future of the nation and of Western civilization.55
The mobilization of the Nazis terrorized individuals,
communities, and society, and Tillich works to combat such atrocities.56 Yet, similar to Stout’s and
West’s appeal to Socratic questioning, Tillich’s diagnosis of the situation also includes self-reflexive
interrogation of one’s own political agenda, where
“[a] movement that no longer questions the rightness
of its own assumptions has become ossified” because this movement “must unmask all ideologies,
including its own.”57 As part of this process, in ways
similar to Stout’s privileging of Hegelian Sittlichkeit,
though aware of its limitations,58 Tillich attempts to
circumscribe the political movement within the unity
of being and consciousness or “the interrelation of
drives and interests, of pressures and aspirations,
which make up social reality.”59 To account fully for
being and consciousness, however, Tillich appropriates the ontological polarities of individuality and
universality and freedom and destiny. Social reality
must be infused with ontological reality to ascertain
that being and consciousness entail the universal:
“Human beings become human by participating in
universal reason.”60 The appeal to universal reason
does not disqualify the particular, but it compels political reflections on power that sustain the particular
but also transcend the particular: “Being comes to
fulfillment only by transcending its immediate
power.”61 The pragmatism of Stout and West rightly
press the epistemological limits of Tillich’s ontology, but Tillich’s ontology, in return, can push Stout
and West to transcend their situated pragmatism.
In analyzing the presuppositions of political romanticism, Tillich isolates the dominant myth of the
origin. This myth of the origin, rooted in blood, soil,
and social groups and resonant with many of Bush’s
policies (see next section), can be broken only

19

through the prophetic “unconditional demand”62 for
justice. This unconditional demand applies to political powers but also to Christianity: “A Christianity
that abandons its prophetic foundation by allying
itself with political romanticism has lost its own
identity.”63 Tillich then makes an important observation that suggests that prophetic critique and democratic freedom are not antithetical; a fortiori, in and
through the example of Liberal Protestantism, “it has
become evident that prophetism as well as autonomy
in their isolation from each other eventually fall back
again into the myth of origin.”64 Prophetic critique
helps ensure that power and freedom do not become
exclusively heteronomous or autonomous (that is,
constitutively separate) but rather theonomous expressions of the interpenetration of religion and culture, the import of the Unconditional and autonomous cultural consciousness.
To be sure, the objectives of Tillich’s religious
socialism do not equate precisely to West’s and
Stout’s traditions of American democracy,65 but they
do articulate the function of the political in terms of
social or communal duties (prophetic demands for
justice) and individual freedom.66 Perhaps more
pointedly, all three thinkers recognize the potency of
political mechanisms and their deleterious effects on
individual, community, and society or, as I have put
it, the moral costs. Tillich describes the rise of the
national power-state, the fusion of “the myth of origin and capitalistic imperialism,”67 that has, in the
case of Germany during Tillich’s time, stifled democratic procedures and subdued the democratic
spirit: “The German bourgeoisie has never fought to
actualize the democratic demands of its own principle” because “it accommodated itself to feudal
forms.”68 In these ways, the myth of origin cannot
overcome its contradiction and cannot protest adequately against “the dehumanizing consequences of
an exclusively rational system”69 that “oppress and
crush the individual.”70 The sophistication of Tillich’s historical, philosophical, and theological
analysis in addressing these moral costs responds to
West’s cautious limitation of religion’s contribution
to democratic reflections attributable, in West’s
judgment, to its inability to “provide the analytical
tools”71 and its “lacking in serious philosophical
substance.”72 Tillich’s more substantive vision of the
role of religion extends Stout’s claim that religion
can contribute to democratic tradition.
In turning to the bourgeois principle and the proletariat, Tillich further examines democracy as “the
rational drive to shape reality”73 and the democratic
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presuppositions of religious socialism. Democracy
and religious socialism function as correctives for
each other and not as forces of separation. On the
one hand, Tillich contends that the democratic principle promoting “the free decisions of all individuals” becomes “thwarted, however, by the reality of
class rule.”74 Religious socialism therefore presses
democracy and its susceptibility to the exploitative
capacities of capitalism by adopting “the prophetic
attitude.”75 On the other hand, attributable to its own
inner antimony or contradiction, religious socialism
needs democracy because just power reflects “the
actualization of social unity” and the inclusion of
individual will within “the will of the whole.”76 Democracy challenges religious socialism to adopt human structures, where, for example “[r]ationality in
economics is not to be abrogated but is to be placed
into the hands of human beings.”77 In this way, democracy functions as a “corrective”78 to religious
socialism’s own mediating between the myth of the
origin’s quest for power and the ultimate demands of
justice. Religious socialism and democracy converge
in expectation: “This is the deeper meaning of egalitarianism, of the demand for equality, in prophetism
and socialism. The inescapability of the demand, a
demand, that is addressed to everyone, makes all
persons equal.”79 This pursuit of equality does not
translate into merely democratic equitable procedures; rather, given that expectation entails both the
universal, unconditional demand for justice and conditional practices grounded in the concrete situation
(both of which are encapsulated in Tillich’s term
belief-ful realism),80 expectation—similar to Stout’s
concept of crisis and West’s concept of hope—must
be both immanent and transcendent. Democratic,
socialist, and prophetic expectation constitutes “a
protest against false concepts of transcendence that
inevitably call for, in opposition, false concepts of
immanence.”81 These false concepts of transcendence include an empirically derived utopia—
analogous to the utopias that concern West—that
can take the form of one that “is impotent against
the actual forces of society,”82 a reactionary restoration of male patriarchalism,83 or “the hegemony of
the myth of origin [that] means the domination of
violence and death.”84 These false forms of democratic life reinforce and ossify the status quo in ways
that prohibit or stifle transformation. Similar to
West’s “walking nihilism,” Tillich’s concept of the
demonic expresses this lack of transformation: it is
“possession” (Besessenheit) that inhibits selfcenteredness because it is an attack (Angriff) on the
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oneness and freedom of the individual.85 Moreover,
similar to West, Tillich indicates that the demonic
can take on a social dimension that engenders selfsufficient finitude in the form of capitalism and corrupts power in the form of nationalism, or the great
demonic of the present (Gegenwart).86 The inbreaking of theonomous forms of prophetic critique
and democratic corrective as imports of hope and
self-transcending realism overcome demonic separation and promote reunion and healing of individuals,
communities, and society. Tillich describes this
moment as the idea of Kairos, “which also does not
lead to rational utopianism or to the mystical negation of the world, but, rather to a new and creative
fulfillment of forms with an import borne by power
and eros but penetrated by obedience to unconditioned form.”87 Kairos thus also meditates between
strict separation and strict union—a mediation that
the Bush administration seems unable or willing to
pursue.
III. Bush and Posner: The Hermeneutics of
Democratic Distrust
The current United States administration, in my
judgment, does not promote a democracy governed
by concerns for social justice and the interrelationship between union and separation. Firmly entrenched in its own myth of origin, the Bush administration appears ossified in the circular movement of
preserving its own origin of power. As Tillich writes
in The Socialist Decision, “This demand [of the
myth of origin] does not reach out to the new, to that
which transcends the origin. It confirms the origin,
but does not go beyond it. It confirms the powers of
origin, the feudal and priestly authorities.”88 The insulated bureaucracy of the Bush administration,
whether illustrated in its unilateral pursuit of war, its
reconfiguration of the Geneva Convention’s rules for
prisoner interrogation,89 or its privileging of large
corporations on environmental and tax issues, creates procedures that reinforce its own power base
and separate and marginalize individuals. Additionally, as Stout, West, and Tillich caution, any political principle and procedure must be subject to a
radical, self-reflexive critique. For example, consider
Bush’s policies pertaining to the war on terror. To be
sure, threats to security demand proactive measures
that perforce compromise some of the ideals of democracy in order to preserve other values, but West
and Stout both articulate criticisms of the Bush’s
policies, that is, they note the moral costs of such
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measures. West points to the ill-conceived democratic rationale underlying Bush’s strategies: “The
Bush administration has subverted the public in order to leads its war against terrorism in the way it
wanted to—attacking Iraq and instituting the dangerous doctrine of preemptive strike rather than focusing on the real terrorist threat.”90 Stout similarly
indicates that self-reflexive critique has been absent
thus far in the war on terror: “In the long run, the
ideological-moral front is the one on which the
struggle against terrorism will be won or lost, and
we are now losing it badly. In truth, there is only one
way to win it, namely, by applying our ideals and
principles to our own conduct with the same sense of
purpose and courage that we demonstrated when
denouncing Taliban thugs.”91
A recent articulation of democracy by legal
theorist and federal judge Richard Posner encapsulates many of the current administration’s sensibilities. Posner appropriates pragmatism, but a form of
pragmatism quite distinct from that of West and
Stout. Posner’s everyday pragmatism, whose roots,
he suggests, lie in Machiavelli,92 seeks to disengage
itself from academic pragmatic philosophy93 or critical reflection on the moral dimensions and costs of
democracy. Posner envisages the democratic process
as one of competition, where, appealing to the work
of Joseph Schumpeter, he submits that democracy
should be an elite democracy: “Here democracy is
conceived of as a method by which members of a
self-interested elite compete for the votes of a basically ignorant and apathetic, as well as determined
self-interested, electorate.”94 The self-interested political elite therefore exploits social structures and, as
West put it above, the public’s sleepwalking lack of
resistance to confront this exploitative power. Posner
distinguishes the transformative and participatory
democratic models of Mill and Dewey (and, we
might add, Stout, West, and Tillich) that focus on
the “cooperative search for truth”95 from his preferred Machiavellian and Weberian vision of democracy that “requires a willingness to compromise, to
dirty one’s hands, to flatter, cajole, pander, bluff,
and lie, [and] to make unprincipled package deals.”96
This willingness to dirty one’s hands has been a
hallmark of the Bush administration. These practices
may protect some democratic values, but we must
again ask at what moral costs.
The limitations and flaws of Posner’s model of
democracy and Bush’s enforcement of it can be
categorized around two central loci. First, Posner’s
anthropological assumptions delimit human beings,
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particularly his reductive portrait of humans as
“merely clever animals.”97 His focus on rational selfinterest as the primary mode of being in the world
disavows the central roles of communal values, principles, and traditions as well as the unity of being
and consciousness advocated by Tillich. Posner’s
everyday pragmatism insists that individuals within
a democratic and free-market environment necessarily would “focus on their material concerns, personal
interests, and opinions.”98 Stout’s model also invites
such focus on concerns and interests, but in ways
that foster dialogue and not monologues of power.
Posner’s anthropological reductions inform a second
weakness, his myopic and attenuated assessment of
common impulses to participate in democratic procedures. “The United States is a tenaciously philistine society. Its citizens have little appetite for abstractions and little time and less inclination to devote substantial time to training themselves to become informed and public-spirited voters.”99 Emphasizing the efficiency and procedural aspects of
democracy in ways analogous to corporate management, Posner submits that “[t]he relation of officials
to voters resembles that between sellers and consumers”100 Posner’s elitist model suffers from what I
denominate as a hermeneutics of trust and distrust—
a trust in the ideology and internal mechanisms of a
powerful elite and a distrust of democratic principles
and traditions among the majority. Such a hermeneutics balkanizes competing voices and centralizes
power, paradigms that clearly operate within the
Bush administration. This separation exacerbates
tendentious clashes along ideological, ethnic identity-based, and class lines.
IV. Concluding Reflections
Where does this leave us? What constructive
proposals might be gleaned from the American history of the separation of church and state, the insights of Stout, West, and Tillich, and the challenges
to Bush and Posner? I offer a few modest proposals
as a conclusion. Through our procedures and power
structures, we have lost sight of the individual within
the democratic process. Reclaiming the voice of the
individual within the cacophony of lobbyists, partisan rhetoric, and corporate posturing seems vital to
our democratic health. Writing his Democratic Vistas shortly after the crisis of the Civil War, Walt
Whitman, beloved by West and Stout alike, admonishes the individual to “[a]lways inform yourself;
always do the best you can; always vote” but, at the

Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 32, 4, Fall 2006

same time, to remain vigilant against opportunistic
political parties: “it behooves you to convey yourself
implicitly to no party, nor submit blindly to their
dictators, but steadily hold yourself judge and master
over all of them.”101 Whitman’s commitment to the
individual within democracy, tempered by a hermeneutics of suspicion (and not a hermeneutics of trust
and distrust), underscores the dialectical character of
separation and union between individual, prophetic
critique, and democratic structures.
The communities of democratic discourse also
have been attenuated by separatists groups (e.g.,
Stout’s criticisms of Black nationalism), marginalized groups (e.g., West’s diagnoses of nihilism and
meaninglessness of those disenfranchised), and dehumanized groups (e.g., Tillich’s concerns over the
corrosive features of capitalism). One mechanism
that could re-invite these groups back into the collective would be to cultivate what Jane Mansbridge
identifies as protective enclaves to support the
voices of muted communities and to reconfigure
hardened boundaries.102 Such enclaves enrich the
democratic exchange of ideas, surmount the impasse
of language and power, and ameliorate the onesidedness of separation or union. Our three interlocutors have argued that these voices must be
heard. Rather than promoting the distrust of religion
within society (Rorty and Rawls), distrust of the
masses (Posner and Bush), or distrust of democracy
(Hauerwas and Milbank), Tillich, Stout, and West
affirm that we must consider the prospects for and
the challenges of ultimate concern, the formation of
individuals in and through social participation, the
interpenetration of religion and culture, and the tensions between evil and good, power and justice, and
tragedy and hope. Addressing these dimensions requires that we consider both the immanence of thick
historicism and our situation and the transcendence
of the prophetic critique and spiritual crisis. Though
they differ on the specific meanings of these dimensions, Stout, West, and Tillich articulate the anthropological, experiential, moral, and axiological dimensions of democracy in ways that can revitalize
our troubled democracies.
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